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Abstract 
We study the properties of mechanisms for deciding upon the provision of public goods when 
the feasible set is exogenously given (by financial and/or technological constraints), and 
individuals' preferences are represented by continuous, increasing and concave utility functions, 
and we establish a result analog to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: strategy-proof 
mechanisms are dictatorial. Further, efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms are strongly 
dictatorial (i.e., maximize the dictator's welfare on the entire feasible set.) 
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study the properties ofmechanisms for deciding upon the provision of
public goods. In our setting, the feasible set is exogenously given (by financial and/or
technological constraints), and individuals’ preferences have the common properties
assumed in economic environments (viz., they can be represented by utility functions
that are continuous, increasing and concave). We show that all mechanisms have
very unappealing properties: they are either incompatible with individual incentives
or dictatorial — i.e., select outcomes in the range of the mechanism attending to
maximize the welfare of a single individual. The exact formulation of these results,
which may regarded as not surprising, as well as the geometry of these problems
and the counterexamples we find, reveal new and interesting features of the problem
of public good provision, and show the extent to which individuals interests are
irreconcilable.
In our study we adopt the social choice framework, although adapted to introduce
the additional structure common to economic problems. In this framework, a mech-
anism is a mapping which associates a feasible outcome with each profile of utility
functions. (Restricting attention to direct mechanism, for which each individual’s
strategy space is the set of his possible utility functions, is justified by the Revelation
Principle.) Since individuals’ preferences are private information, we require that
mechanisms be strategy-proof; i.e., that each individual be best off reporting a utility
function representing his true preferences, independently of the utility functions the
other individuals report. Strategy-proof mechanisms are therefore compatible with
individual incentives regardless of the information and prior belief each individual
has about the preferences of the other individuals.
The properties of strategy-proof mechanisms depend largely on the domain of pref-
erences on which decisions are to be made, as well as on the set of feasible outcomes.
Gibbard[3] and Satterthwaite[7] have shown that when the set of feasible outcomes is
finite and individuals’ preferences are unrestricted, strategy-proof mechanisms whose
range contains three or more outcomes are dictatorial. Barberà and Peleg[2] have
established that the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem remains valid even if the set of
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feasible outcomes is infinite (any metric space) and preferences are restricted to be
continuous. When preferences monotonic as well as continuous, Moreno[5] has shown
that a weaker version of this result still holds: strategy-proof mechanisms whose un-
dominated range1 contains three or more outcomes are dictatorial on the subdomain
of profiles of strictly increasing utility functions.
When preferences are convex as well as continuous there are mechanisms with a
one dimensional range that are both strategy-proof and non-dictatorial. (Moulin[6]
characterizes this class as median voter mechanisms; see also Barberà and Jackson[1].)
Zhou[8] has shown, however, that also on this domain the conclusion of the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite Theorem arises whenever the range of the mechanism contains a two
dimensional set. (The dimensionality condition effectively requires that for any two
outcomes in the range there be a third outcome in this set which is not a convex
combination of the first two, so that any preference ordering over the three outcomes
be possible.)
The results of the present paper establish a version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Theorem for the domain of preferences commonly associated with public goods in
economic environments; namely, when individuals’ preferences are described by con-
tinuous, concave and increasing utility functions: strategy-proof mechanisms whose
undominated range satisfies a dimensionality condition are dictatorial on the sub-
domain of profiles of strictly increasing utility functions. The dimensionality con-
dition on the undominated range is the counterpart (in the geometry imposed by
the monotonicity of preferences) of Zhou’s dimensionality condition; specifically, it is
required that for any two outcomes in the undominated range there be a third out-
come in this set which is not dominated by a convex combination of the first two, so
that any preference ordering over the three outcomes be possible. We provide exam-
ples showing that this condition is essential to obtain the result. Interestingly, there
are examples of strategy-proof mechanisms that are not dictatorial on the subdo-
main of profiles of strictly increasing utility functions, and do not seem to be median
1The undominated range of a mechanism is the subset of its range containing the outcomes for
which there are no other outcomes in the range containing no less of any good and more of at least
one good.
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voter type mechanisms; e.g., the mechanism discussed in Example 2 below produces a
range which cannot be ordered in such a way that individuals’ preferences be “singled
peaked,” which suggests that this mechanism cannot be written as a median voter
mechanism.
The conclusions we obtain, albeit weaker than those obtained when satiated pref-
erences are admissible, are undoubtedly negative: strategy-proof mechanisms are
dictatorial on the subdomain of profiles of strictly increasing utility functions. Of
course, it is on this subdomain, which is dense subset of the domain in the topolo-
gies commonly used in these contexts, that individual’s conflicting interests manifest
more clearly (and crudely). Further, we show that if a mechanism is also non-wasteful
(that is, it is such that no outcome on its range is dominated by another feasible out-
come) then it must be (fully) dictatorial. In addition, we establish that when the
(undominated) feasible set satisfies the dimensionality condition, strategy-proof and
efficient mechanisms (that is, it is such that the outcome it associates to each profile
of preferences is Pareto optimal with respect to this profile) are strongly dictatorial ;
i.e., they maximize the dictator’s welfare on the entire feasible set, without any other
constraint. Finally, we also show that when the set of admissible utility functions is
the set of all continuous, concave and strictly increasing utility functions, then only
(fully) dictatorial mechanisms are strategy-proof. The present results therefore leave
little doubt that the conclusion of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem is pervasive
in public good economies.
Even though we are unable to use the existing results directly, our approach relies
heavily on the literature. Barberà & Peleg[2] provide a direct proof (i.e., a proof
that does not appeal to Arrow’s Theorem) of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, as
well as of their own theorem. The argument of their proof is very general, and can
be adapted to other domains. Using this approach Zhou[8] establishes his theorem,
overcoming the need of “bimodal” utility functions used in the proof of the Barberà
& Peleg Theorem by providing new and interesting arguments that reveal the role
of the dimensionality condition. Moreno[5] also uses the argument introduced by
Barberà & Peleg showing that it can be adapted to the geometry of increasing utility
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functions, even though the argument yields conclusions that are weaker than those
obtained by Barberà & Peleg. In the present paper we also follow the argument of
Barberà & Peleg, and in order to resolve the difficulties that arise in dealing with
a smaller domain we borrow both from Zhou[8] and from Moreno[5]. Adapting the
argument turned out to be a difficult task, which required that we refine some of the
intermediate results and establish new ones. In the end, however, we show once again
this approach to be fruitful.
We present our results, discuss their implications, and present some examples in
Section 2. The proofs are given in Section 3.
2 Results and Examples
We consider allocations problems where a group of individuals N = {1, . . . , n} must
decide the provision of l public goods. The set of feasible outcomes (i.e., bundles of
public goods) is denoted by X, a compact subset of Rl+. Individuals’ preferences are
described by utility functions, u : Rl+ → <. (For simplicity, individuals’ consumption
sets are taken to be Rl+). For a, b ∈ Rl+, we write a ≥ b (aÀ b) if ak ≥ bk (ak > bk) for
k = 1, ..., l; and we write a > b if ak ≥ bk and a 6= b. A utility function is increasing
if for each a, b ∈ Rl+, a > b implies u (a) ≥ u (b) , and a À b implies u (a) > u (b) ;
it is strictly increasing if a > b implies u (a) > u (b). We denote by U the set of all
continuous, increasing and concave utility functions. For u ∈ Un and S ⊂ N , u−S is
the profile obtained from u by deleting the utility functions of the members of S.
An allocation mechanism (or simply a mechanism) is a mapping f : Un → X.A
mechanism f is manipulable by Individual i at u = (u−i, ui) ∈ Un if there is u0 ∈
U such that ui(f(u−i, u0)) > ui(f(u)). A mechanism is strategy-proof if it is not
manipulable by any i ∈ N at any u ∈ Un. A mechanism f is dictatorial on Ω ⊂ Un
if there is an individual i ∈ N such that for each u ∈ Ω, f(u) maximizes ui on f(Ω);
when this is the case, we refer to Individual i as a dictator for f on Ω. A mechanism
f is dictatorial if it is dictatorial on Un; we refer to a dictator for f on Un as a
dictator.
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Strategy-proofness requires that “truthful revelation” be always an “equilibrium.”
When preferences are private information and individuals’ prior beliefs about the pref-
erences of the other individuals are unknown, this condition is necessary for a mech-
anism to be incentive compatible. Dictatorial mechanisms always select the outcome
on the mechanism’s range attending to maximize the dictator’s welfare. Thus, when
there are conflicting interests between the dictator’s and the other individuals, the
dictator’s interest prevails.
The literature has generally found that strategy-proof mechanisms have very
unappealing properties: viz., strategy-proof mechanisms are dictatorial (see, e.g.,
Gibbard[3], Satterthwaite[7], Barberà and Peleg[2], Zhou[8], Moreno[5]). The public
good economies considered here, however, are outside the scope of the existing results.
Zhou[8], in particular, establishes that if all continuous and concave utility func-
tions are admissible, then strategy-proof mechanisms whose range contains a two
dimensional set are dictatorial.2 The following example shows that for the domain
considered here there are strategy-proof and non-dictatorial mechanisms with a two
dimensional range, and therefore that the analog of Zhou’s Theorem does not hold
when admissible utility functions are further restricted to be increasing.3
Example 1. There are two public goods, and the set of feasible outcomes is
X =
©
(x1, x2) ∈ <2+ | x21 + x22 ≤ 1
ª
.
For each u ∈ U, letm(u) = (m1 (u) ,m2 (u)) denote the maximizer of u onX. Consider
the mechanism f : Un → X which for each u ∈ Un, selects
f(u) =
µ
x1,
q
1− x21
¶
,
where x1 is the “median” of m1 (u1) , ...,m1 (un). (If n is even, pick an arbitrary
point in [0, 1] and calculate the median adding this point.) This is a non-dictatorial
2Actually, Zhou’s Theorem is a slightly more general result (see Theorem 2 in Zhou[8] for a
precise statement). We provide this formulation to facilitate comparison to the present results.
3Zhou[8] also provides an application of his theorem to provision problems where the feasible is
linear and individuals’ preferences are described by continuous, strictly concave and strictly increas-
ing utility functions. We discuss this application in connection with Example 4 below.
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mechanism whose range is the set
f(Un) =
©
(x1, x2) ∈ <2+ | x21 + x22 = 1
ª
,
a two dimensional set. It is easy to prove that this mechanism is also strategy-proof:
let i ∈ N and u ∈ Un be such that f(u) 6= m(ui); then either (1) f1 (u0i,u−i) ≥
f1(u) > m1(ui) for each u0i ∈ U, or (2) f1 (u0i,u−i) ≤ f1(u) < m1(ui) for each u0i ∈ U ;
thus, as ui is increasing and concave one has
ui(f(u)) ≥ ui(f (u0i,u−i)),
for each u0i ∈ U. Hence f is strategy-proof.
A key feature of this example is that the underlying set of preferences that can
be represented by increasing and concave utility functions are single peaked in the
range of the mechanism; i.e., there is a natural order º on f(Un) (namely, x º x0 if
x1 ≥ x01) such that for each u ∈ U there is x∗ ∈ f (Un) with the property that for
each x, x0 ∈ f (Un) with x∗ º x Â x0 (or x0 Â x º x∗), one has u(x) > u(x0). As
the following example shows, however, there are strategy-proof and non-dictatorial
mechanisms whose range is a two dimensional set on which preferences represented
by increasing and concave utility functions need not be single peaked. A selection
on X is a mapping σ : 2X → X that assigns to each non-empty set A ⊂ X, a point
σ(A) ∈ A.
Example 2. Consider the decision problem in Example 1. Let
A =
½
(1, 0) ,
µ
1√
2
,
1√
2
¶¾
,
let
B = A ∪
½µ
1
4
,
3
4
¶
, (0, 1)
¾
,
and let σ be an arbitrary selection on X. For u ∈ U and Z ⊂ X, write M (u, Z) for
the set of maximizers of u on Z, and let the mechanism f : Un → X be given for
each u ∈ Un by
f (u) =



σ (M (u1, B )) if (1, 0) /∈M (u1, B) ,
σ (M (u2, A )) otherwise.
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This mechanism is not dictatorial. Moreover, it is strategy-proof; clearly, indi-
viduals 2, ..., n cannot manipulate; further, Individual 1 cannot manipulate either as
f (u) /∈ M (u1, B) implies {(1, 0)} ∈ M (u1, B) and f (u) =
³
1√
2
, 1√
2
´
, and therefore
as u1 is increasing and concave, one has u1 (f (u)) ≥ u1 (x) for each x ∈ B\{(1, 0)}.
Also it is easy to see that there is no “order” on B = f (Un) according to which
all continuous increasing and concave utility functions represent single-peaked pref-
erences.
These examples suggest that when preferences are described by increasing as well
as concave utility functions, assuming that the range of the mechanism is at least a two
dimensional set does not imply that a strategy-proof mechanism must be dictatorial
as in Zhou’s Theorem. It turns out, however, that under an analogous condition a
slight weaker conclusion arises.
For A ⊂ Rl, write bA for the set {a ∈ A | @a0 ∈ A : a0 > a} . (Thus, if A ⊂ R2,
then bA is the “northeast” boundary of A.). Given a mechanism f, we refer to the set
\f(Un) as the undominated range of the mechanism. For each a, b ∈ Rl, by [a, b] the
(closed) segment connecting a and b, i.e.,
[a, b] =
©
x ∈ Rl | x = λa+ (1− λ) b, λ ∈ [0, 1]ª .
Also write Λ (a, b) for the set containing the vectors on and above [a, b] ; i.e.,
Λ (a, b) =
©
x ∈ Rl | ∃x0 ∈ [a, b] : x ≥ x0ª
Three vectors a, b, c ⊂ Rl are said to be monotonically affinely independent (m.a.i.)
if a /∈ Λ (b, c) , b /∈ Λ (a, c) , and c /∈ Λ (a, b) (i.e., if no point is greater than or equal to
a convex combination of the other two). Condition D below plays a role in Theorem
1 below analog to the condition in Zhou’s Theorem that “the range of a mechanism
be at least a two dimensional set.”
Condition D. A set A ⊂ Rl+ satisfies Condition D if it is not a singleton, and if for
each a, b ∈ A, there is c ∈ A such that a, b, c are monotonically affinely independent.
Note that the dimension of a set A ⊂ Rl is at least two if (and only if) for all
a, b ∈ A there is c ∈ A such that a, b, and c are affinely independent (or equivalently,
7
such that no point is a convex combination of the other two). Hence every set
satisfying Condition D contains a two-dimensional subset, although the converse does
not hold; e.g., the range of the mechanisms defined in examples 1 and 2 are both two-
dimensional sets, but they do not satisfy Condition D. The set
©
(1, 0) , (0, 1) ,
¡
1
3
, 1
3
¢ª
,
or the simplex in R3 are examples of sets satisfying Condition D. Note that Condition
D effectively requires that at least two public goods be provided.
Theorem 1 below establishes a result analog to Zhou’s Theorem for the domain of
utility profiles whose coordinates are continuous increasing and concave utility func-
tions. Denote by U˙ the set of admissible utility functions that are strictly increasing.
Theorem 1. Let f be a strategy-proof mechanism such that \f(Un) satisfies Condition
D. Then f is dictatorial on U˙n. Moreover, if Individual i is the dictator for f on U˙n,
then for each u ∈ U˙n, f(u) maximizes ui on f(Un).
Theorem 1 identifies an important subdomain where every strategy-proof mech-
anism satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 1 must be dictatorial; namely, the set
of profiles whose coordinates are strictly increasing utility functions.4 Moreover, on
this subdomain the mechanism selects the dictator’s most preferred outcome on the
entire range.
The conclusion of Theorem 1 is weaker than that of Zhou’s Theorem, but as
Example 3 shows a dictator on U˙n need not be a (full) dictator.
Example 3. There are three public goods, and the set of feasible outcomes is
X =
©
x ∈ <3+ | x1 + x2 + x3 ≤ 1
ª
. Let a mechanism f : Un → X be given for each
u ∈ Un by f(u) = (0, 0, 0) if u2 (x1, x2, x3) = x1x2x3; otherwise let f(u) be some
arbitrary maximizer of u1 on {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)}. Note that f is strategy-
proof and \f (Un) = Xˆ satisfies Condition D. Thus, f is within the scope of Theorem
1, and is therefore dictatorial on U˙n. Nonetheless, it is not (fully) dictatorial. (See
Moreno[5] for further discussion of this example).
Two features of the mechanism in Example 3 are worth pointing out: the mech-
anism is both wasteful (i.e., it does not always exhaust the existing resources), and
4In addition, the set U˙ is a dense subset of U in the most commonly used topologies; e.g., the
compact-open topology, or the topology of closed convergence — see Hildenbrand[4].
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inefficient (when the dictator for f on U˙n does not get one of his most preferred out-
come, it is possible to make him better off without making anybody else worse off).
Propositions 1 and 2 below establish that these features are common to all mecha-
nisms that satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 1 but are not (fully) dictatorial. In
particular, Proposition 1 establishes that mechanisms that satisfy the assumptions of
Theorem 1 mechanisms and are non-wasteful (i.e., satisfy f(Un) ⊂ Xˆ) are (fully) dic-
tatorial. Note that since admissible utility functions need not be strictly increasing,
wastefulness does not imply inefficiency.
Proposition 1. Every strategy-proof and non-wasteful mechanism f such that f(Un)
satisfies Condition D is dictatorial.
Proposition 2 below establishes that only strongly dictatorial mechanisms are
strategy-proof and efficient. (A mechanism f is efficient if for each u ∈ Un, f (u) is
Pareto optimal with respect to u.) Note that in Proposition 2 Condition D is imposed
on the undominated feasible set, Xˆ, rather than on the range of the mechanism. In
the proof of Proposition 2 it is shown that the range of a strategy-proof and efficient
mechanism coincides with Xˆ, which therefore satisfies Condition D. This also provides
a stronger contain to the implication of Proposition 2, since it is shown as mechanisms
satisfying its assumptions maximize the dictator’s welfare on the entire feasible set.
In the literature, mechanism with this property are referred to as strongly dictatorial.
(Formally, a mechanism f is strongly dictatorial if there is an individual i ∈ N such
that for each u ∈ Un, f(u) maximizes ui on X.)
Proposition 2. If Xˆ satisfies Condition D, then every strategy-proof and efficient
mechanism f : Un → X is strongly dictatorial.
Finally, Proposition 3 establishes a conclusion stronger than that of Theorem 1
for mechanism whose domain is the set of profiles of utility functions whose coordi-
nates are continuous, concave and strictly increasing: For this domain strategy-proof
mechanisms whose range satisfies Condition D are dictatorial.
Proposition 3. Every strategy-proof mechanism f : U˙n → X such that f(U˙n) satisfies
Condition D is dictatorial.
Note that, as in Theorem 1, Condition D is essential in proposition 1 to 3: even
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though the range of the mechanisms in the scope of these results contain only un-
dominated outcomes, imposing that this be at least a two dimensional set does not
imply that the mechanism be dictatorial, as Example 1 above shows.
We finish this section with a discussion of the applications of our results to an
interesting class of economies, which is described in Example 4 below.
Example 4. There are l ≥ 3 public goods, and the set of feasible outcomes is
X =
©
x ∈ Rl+ | px ≤ G
ª
, where the coordinates of p ∈ Rl++ can be interpreted as
the prices of the public goods that can be provided, and G > 0 as the government’s
budget for public expenditure.
Every strategy-proof mechanism f : Un → X such that \f(Un) satisfies Condition
D is dictatorial on U˙n (Theorem 1); if in addition f is non-wasteful (i.e., it exhausts
the budget), then it is (fully) dictatorial (Proposition 1). And since Xˆ satisfies
Condition D, every strategy-proof and efficient mechanism f : Un → X is strongly
dictatorial.
For the economies described in Example 4, Zhou[8] shows (Theorem 3) that if a
mechanism f : U˙n → X is strategy-proof and unanimous (i.e., such that for each
u ∈ U˙ , f(u, . . . , u) maximizes u on X), then it is dictatorial. This conclusion can be
obtained as a corollary of Proposition 3, since unanimity implies f(U˙n) ⊇ Xˆ, and
because f(U˙n) = \f(U˙n) (see the proof of Proposition 3 in the Section 3), we have
\f(U˙n) ⊇ Xˆ, and thus f(U˙n) = \f(U˙n) = Xˆ ; hence f satisfies the assumptions of
Proposition 3. (Note that, as in Proposition 2 above, f is dictatorial in the stronger
sense that it maximizes the dictator’s welfare on the entire feasible set.)
3 Proofs
Throughout this section, let U be the set of all the continuous, concave and increasing
utility functions, and let f : Un → X be a strategy-proof mechanism. For each
u ∈ U let the mechanism fu : Un−1 → X be given, for each u−n ∈ Un−1, by
fu(u−n) = f(u−n, u). Note that each fu is also a strategy-proof mechanism. For each
u ∈ U, write O(u) = fu(Un−1) ∩ \f(Un). The set O(u) provides the “options” (i.e.,
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outcomes in the undominated range) that are attainable by individuals 1, ..., n − 1,
when Individual n reports the utility function u. Also write U∗ for the set containing
the utility functions in U with a unique maximizer on f(Un), and U˙∗ for the set
U∗ ∩ U˙ . Note that the maximizer of each u ∈ U∗ on f(Un), denoted by m (u) , is a
member of \f (Un).
The proof proceeds by showing that a mechanism f satisfying the assumptions
of Theorem 1 must be dictatorial on (U˙∗)n. With this result it is straightforward to
show that f is also dictatorial on U˙n. In proving this the correspondence O plays a
fundamental role. The key insight is to note that if f is dictatorial on (U˙∗)n, then
O has a peculiar structure: if Individual n is the dictator,then for each u ∈ U˙∗ the
set of options for individuals 1, . . . n− 1 is a singleton, m(u), whereas if the dictator
is somebody else, then for each u ∈ U˙∗ the set of options for individuals 1, . . . n − 1
must be constant and equal the entire set \f(Un). Showing that O has this structure
(Lemma 10) turns out to be a difficult task in our setting, and requires that we
establish first a number of preliminary results.
We begin by stating some known properties of strategy-proof mechanisms. The
proof of P1 can be found in Zhou[8] (Lemma 1), whereas the proofs of P2− P6 are
given in Moreno[5] (lemmas 3 to 7). Given an arbitrary set A ⊂ Rl, denote by A¯ its
closure.
P1. (Unanimity) For each u ∈ U, f(u, ..., u) maximizes u on f(Un).
P2. For each u ∈ U∗, m(u) ∈ O(u).
P3. f(U˙n) ⊂ \f(Un).
P4. For each x ∈ f(Un), there is x0 ∈ f(Un) such that x0 ≥ x.
P5. For each u ∈ U , O(u) is closed relative to \f(Un).
P6. For each x ∈ f(Un)\f(Un), there is x0 ∈ \f(Un) such that x0 > x.
We now establish a number of intermediate results. For each a, b ∈ Rl, write by
(a, b) = [a, b] \{a, b} for the open segment connecting a and b.
Lemma 1. Let x1, x2, x3, x4 be four distinct points in \f(Un).
L1.1. If x4 ∈ Λ(x1, x2) and x2 ∈ Λ(x3, x4), then x2 ∈ Λ(x1, x3) and x4 ∈
Λ(x1, x3).
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L1.2. If x4 ∈ Λ(x1, x2), then either x4 /∈ Λ(x1, x3) or x4 /∈ Λ(x2, x3).
L1.3. If x4 ∈ Λ(x1, x2) and x1 ∈ Λ(x2, x3), then x4 /∈ Λ(x1, x3).
Proof: Let x1, x2, x3, x4 be four distinct points in \f(Un).
We proof L1.1. Assume x4 ∈ Λ(x1, x2) and x2 ∈ Λ(x3, x4); then
x4 ≥ λx1 + (1− λ)x2,
and
x2 ≥ tx3 + (1− t)x4
for some λ, t ∈ (0, 1). Thus
x4 ≥ λx1 + (1− λ)(tx3 + (1− t)x4),
and therefore
x4 ≥ βx1 + (1− β)x3,
where β = λλ+t(1−λ) ∈ (0, 1). Hence x4 ∈ Λ(x1, x3). The proof that x2 ∈ Λ(x1, x3) is
analogous.
We prove L1.2. Denote by r the line passing through x1 and x2, and for x ∈ Rl
write xr for the orthogonal projection of x on r. Note that because x1, x2, x3 ∈ \f(Un)
we have x1 6= (x3)r and x2 6= (x3)r. Now, assume by way of contradiction that
x4 ∈ Λ(x1, x2) ∩Λ(x1, x3) ∩ Λ(x2, x3). Since x4 ∈ Λ(x1, x2) and x1, x2, x4 ∈ \f(Un)
then (x4)r ∈ (x1, x2). Likewise since x4 ∈ Λ(x1, x3), then (x4)r ∈ (x1, (x3)r), and
since x4 ∈ Λ(x2, x3), then (x4)r ∈ (x2, (x3)r). Therefore
(x4)r ∈ (x1, x2) ∩ (x1, (x3)r) ∩ (x2, (x3)r) = ∅,
which is a contradiction.
Finally, we prove L1.3. Assume by way of contradiction that x1 ∈ Λ(x2, x3) and
x4 ∈ Λ(x1, x2) ∩ Λ(x1, x3). Since x1 ∈ Λ(x2, x3) we have Λ(x1, x2) ⊂ Λ(x2, x3), and
therefore x4 ∈ Λ(x2, x3). This contradicts L1.2. ¤
Lemma 2. Let u ∈ U˙∗. For each x ∈ O(u) there is x0 ∈ O(u) such that x0 ≥ x.
Proof: Let u ∈ U˙∗ and let x ∈ O(u). Assume by way of contradiction that there
is no x0 ∈ O(u) such that x0 ≥ x. Let x¯ ∈ argmax
P
xk on (x + Rl+) ∩ O(u). Then
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Figure 1: The sequence {uq} in Lemma 2.
x¯ ∈ O(u) \ O(u) and (x¯ + Rl+)\{x¯} ∩ O(u) = ∅. Since x¯ ∈ O(u), then x¯ ∈ f(Un),
and therefore by P4 and P6 there is x0 ≥ x¯ such that x0 ∈ \f(Un); moreover, since
x0 /∈ O(u) by assumption andO(u) is closed relative to\f(Un) (by P5), then x0 /∈ O(u).
Hence x0 6= x¯, and x0 > x¯. Let uˆ be such that m(uˆ) = x0, and let {uq} ⊂ U˙ be a
sequence of utility functions whose upper contour sets on x¯ approach x¯ + Rl+, and
whose upper contour sets on x0 approach x0 + Rl+ (see Figure 1).
Since the sequence {f(uq, ..., uq, u)} ⊂ O(u) is bounded, it has a convergent subse-
quence {f(uqs, ..., uqs, u)}.We show that the limit of {f(uqs , ..., uqs , u)} is x¯. Assume,
by way of contradiction, that lim fu(uqs, uqs, ..., uqs) = xˆ 6= x¯; since ((x¯+Rl+)\{x¯})∩
O(u) = ∅ and lim fu(uqs, uqs, ..., uqs) ∈ O(u), then xˆ /∈ (x¯+Rl+)\{x¯}. Therefore there
is sˆ be sufficiently large that uqs(x¯) > uqs(xˆ) for qs ≥ qsˆ, and there are s¯ > sˆ suf-
ficiently large that fu(uqs¯, uqs¯ , ..., uqs¯) is so close to xˆ, and x¯0 ∈ O(u) so close to x¯
that uqs¯(x¯0) > uqs¯(fu(uqs¯ , uqs¯ , ..., uqs¯)). This contradicts P1. Hence {f(uqs , ..., uqs , u)}
converges to x¯. Analogously, the sequence {f(uqs, ..., uqs , uˆ)} ⊂ O(uˆ) has a convergent
subsequence, {f(uqsk , ..., uqsk , uˆ)}, whose limit is x0. Now, since f is strategy-proof,
for each qsk we have
u(f(uqsk , ..., uqsk , u)) ≥ u(f(uqsk , ..., uqsk , uˆ)),
and therefore in the limit
u(x¯) ≥ u(x0),
which is a contradiction. ¤
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Lemma 3. Let u ∈ U˙∗. For each x¯ ∈ O(u) and y ∈ \f(Un)\O(u) there is xˆ ∈
Λ(x¯, y) ∩O(u) such that (Λ(xˆ, y)\{xˆ}) ∩O(u) = ∅.
Proof: Let u ∈ U˙∗, x¯ ∈ O(u) and y ∈ \f(Un)\O(u). For x ∈ Λ(x¯, y)∩O(u) define
g(x) = λ, where λ is the smallest number in [0, 1] such that x ≥ λx¯+(1− λ)y. Since
g is a continuous function it has a minimum on Λ(x¯, y) ∩O(u) (a compact set). Let
xˆ ∈ argminx∈Λ(x¯,y)∩O(u) g(x) be such that there is no xˆ0 ∈ argminx∈Λ(x¯,y)∩O(u) g(x)
such that xˆ0 > xˆ. Since y ∈ \f(Un)\O(u) and O(u) is closed relative to \f(Un) by P5,
y /∈ O(u). (If y ∈ O(u), then y ∈ \f(Un) ∩ O(u) and therefore y ∈ O(u), which is a
contradiction.) Thus xˆ 6= y, and since y ∈ \f(Un), we have g(xˆ) > 0. We show that
(Λ(xˆ, y)\{xˆ}) ∩ O(u) = ∅. Suppose that there is x ∈ (Λ(xˆ, y)\{xˆ}) ∩ O(u). Then
there is λ ∈ (0, 1] such that
x ≥ λxˆ+ (1− λ)y ≥ λ(g(xˆ)x¯+ (1− g(xˆ))y) + (1− λ)y;
i.e.,
x ≥ λg(xˆ)x¯+ (1− λg(xˆ))y.
Hence g(x) ≤ λg(xˆ). If λ = 1, we have g(x) = g(xˆ), x ≥ xˆ, and (because x 6= xˆ) x > xˆ,
which contradicts our choice of xˆ. If λ 6= 1, then g(x) < g(xˆ), and since x ∈ Λ(x¯, y)∩
O(u) (because Λ(xˆ, y) ⊂ Λ(x¯, y)) this contradicts that xˆ ∈ argminx∈Λ(x¯,y)∩O(u) g(x).
Now xˆ ∈ O(u), for if xˆ ∈ O(u) \O(u) then by L2 there is x ∈ O(u) such that x ≥ xˆ;
but then x ∈ (Λ(xˆ, y)\{xˆ}) ∩O(u) which is a contradiction.
Lemma 4. Let u, u0 ∈ U˙∗ be such that m(u) = m(u0). Then O(u) = O(u0).
Proof: Let u, u0 ∈ U˙∗ such that m(u) = m(u0) = x¯, and assume that ∃y ∈
O(u)\O(u0). Since x¯ ∈ O(u0) (by P2) and y ∈ \f(Un)\O(u0), then by Lemma 3
there is xˆ ∈ Λ(x¯, y) ∩ O(u0) such that (Λ(xˆ, y)\{xˆ}) ∩ O(u0) = ∅. Let {uq} ⊂ U˙
be a sequence of utility functions such that their upper contour sets on xˆ approach
Λ(xˆ, y) and their upper contour sets on y approach y + Rl+ (see Figure 2). Since
{f(uq, ..., uq, u0)} ⊂ O(u0) is a bounded sequence, it has a convergent subsequence
{f(uqs, ..., uqs, u0)} whose limit is xˆ — this is established by an argument analogous
to that given in the proof of Lemma 2. Also the sequence {f(uqs, ..., uqs, u)} ⊂ O(u)
has a convergent subsequence {f(uqsk , ..., uqsk , u)} whose limit is y. Now, since f is
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Figure 2: The sequence {uq} in Lemma 5.
strategy-proof, for each qsk we have
u(f(uqsk , ..., uqsk , u)) ≥ u(f(uqsk , ..., uqsk , u0)),
and therefore
u(y) ≥ u(xˆ),
which is a contradiction since m(u) = x¯, xˆ ∈ Λ(x¯, y)\{y} and u is strictly increasing
and concave. 2
Lemma 5. Let u ∈ U˙∗, x¯ ∈ O(u)\{m(u)}, and y ∈ \f(Un)\O(u). Then either
x¯ ∈ Λ(m(u), y) or (Λ(x¯, y)\{x¯}) ∩O(u) 6= ∅.
Proof: Let u ∈ U˙∗, x¯ ∈ O(u)\{m(u)}, and y ∈ \f(Un)\O(u). Assume, by
way of contradiction, that x¯ /∈ Λ(m(u), y) and (Λ(x¯, y)\{x¯}) ∩ O(u) = ∅. Since
x¯ /∈ Λ(m(u), y), by Lemma 4 we can assume, without loss of generality, that u(y) >
u(x¯). Let {uq} ⊂ U˙ be a sequence of utility functions whose upper contour sets
at x¯ approach Λ(x¯, y), and at y approach y + Rl+ (see Figure 2). The sequence
{f(uq, ..., uq, u)} ⊂ O(u) has a convergent subsequence {f(uqs , ..., uqs, u)} whose limit
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can only be x¯. (The proof of this fact is analogous to that given in Lemma 2.) Likewise
the sequence {f(uqs, ..., uqs, uˆ)}, where uˆ∈ U˙∗ is such thatm(uˆ) = y, has a convergent
subsequence {f(uqsk , ..., uqsk , uˆ)} whose limit is y. However, since f is strategy-proof,
for each qsk we have
u(f(uqsk , ..., uqsk , u)) ≥ u(f(uqsk , ..., uqsk , uˆ)),
and therefore in the limit u(x¯) ≥ u(y), which is a contradiction. 2
Lemma 6. Let u ∈ U˙∗, x¯ ∈ O(u), y ∈ \f(Un)\O(u). If m(u), x¯, y are m.a.i., then
there is xˆ ∈ (Λ(m(u), y)\{m(u)}) ∩O(u) such that (Λ(xˆ, y)\{xˆ}) ∩O(u) = ∅.
Proof: Let u ∈ U˙∗, x¯ ∈ O(u), and y ∈ \f(Un)\O(u) be such that m(u), x¯, y are
m.a.i. By Lemma 3 there is xˆ ∈ Λ(x¯, y) ∩O(u) such that (Λ(xˆ, y)\{xˆ}) ∩ O(u) = ∅.
Moreover, xˆ 6= m(u) for if xˆ ∈ Λ(x¯, y) then m(u), x¯, y would not be m.a.i.. Lemma 5
therefore implies that xˆ ∈ Λ(m(u), y). 2
The next lemma is the analog of Zhou’s step three (adapted to the geometry of
increasing utility functions). A set A ⊂ Rl+ is monotonically-star-shaped relative to
B ⊂ Rl+ with respect to a base point x ∈ A if for each y ∈ A, Λ(x, y) ∩ B ⊂ A.
Lemma 7. For each u ∈ U˙∗, O(u) is monotonically-star-shaped relative to \f (Un)
with respect to m(u).
Proof: Let u ∈ U˙∗ and x¯ ∈ O(u), and assume that there is y ∈ Λ(x¯,m(u)) ∩
\f(Un) such that y /∈ O(u). By Lemma 3 there is xˆ ∈ Λ(x¯, y) ∩ O(u) such that
(Λ(xˆ, y)\{xˆ}) ∩ O(u) = ∅. If xˆ = x¯, then we have (Λ(x¯, y)\{x¯}) ∩ O(u) = ∅ and
x¯ /∈ Λ(m(u), y), which contradicts Lemma 5. If xˆ 6= x¯, then xˆ /∈ Λ(y,m(u)) by L1.3.
Then we have xˆ ∈ O(u)\{m(u)} and y ∈ \f(Un)\O(u) such that xˆ /∈ Λ(m(u), y) and
(Λ(xˆ, y)\{xˆ}) ∩O(u) = ∅, which again contradicts Lemma 5. 2
Lemma 8. Let u, u0 ∈ U˙∗ and x¯ ∈ O(u)\Λ(m(u),m(u0)). Then x¯ ∈ O(u0).
Proof: Let u, u0 ∈ U˙∗ and x¯ ∈ O(u)\Λ(m(u),m(u0)). If m(u) = m(u0), x¯ ∈ O(u0)
by Lemma 4. Assume that m(u) 6= m(u0) and x¯ /∈ O(u0). Since x¯ /∈ Λ(m(u),m(u0))
by Lemma 4 we can assume, without loss of generality, that que u(x¯) < u(m(u0)). By
Lemma 3 there is xˆ ∈ Λ(m(u0), x¯) ∩ O(u0) such that (Λ(xˆ, x¯)\{xˆ}) ∩ O(u0) = ∅. Let
{uq} ⊂ U˙ be a sequence of utility functions whose upper counter sets at xˆ approach
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Λ(xˆ, x¯), and at x¯ approach x¯+ Rl+ (see Figure 2). The sequence {f(uq, ..., uq, u0)} ⊂
O(u0) has a subsequence {f(uqs , ..., uqs, u0)} whose limit is xˆ. Likewise, the sequence
{f(uqs, ..., uqs, u)} has a convergent subsequence {f(uqsk , ..., uqsk , u)} whose limit is x¯.
However, since f is strategy-proof, for each qsk we have
u(f(uqsk , ..., uqsk , u)) ≥ u(f(uqsk , ..., uqsk , u0)),
and therefore in the limit u(x¯) ≥ u(xˆ), which is a contradiction, since u(x¯) < u(m(u0))
and xˆ ∈ Λ(x¯,m(u0)). 2
Lemma 9. Assume that \f (Un) satisfies Condition D. Then for each u ∈ U˙∗, either
O(u) = {m(u)} or O(u) = \f (Un).
Proof: Assume that \f(Un) satisfies Condition D. Suppose, by way of contradic-
tion, that there are u ∈ U˙∗, y ∈ O(u)\{m(u)}, and z ∈ \f(Un)\O(u). Then by Lemma
3 there is x¯ ∈ Λ(y, z)∩O(u) such that (Λ(x¯, z)\{x¯})∩O(u) = ∅. We distinguish two
cases: x¯ = m(u) (Case I), and x¯ 6= m(u) (Case II). We show that in both cases we
reach a contradiction.
Case 1: Assume that x¯ = m(u). Let u0 ∈ U˙∗ be such thatm(u0) = z. Since \f(Un)
satisfies Condition D there is c ∈ \f(Un) such that m(u),m(u0), c are m.a.i. Moreover,
we have
(1.a) Λ(m(u0), c) ∩O(u) = ∅,
(1.b) c /∈ O(u0) and
(1.c) m(u) ∈ O(u0).
(These facts are established below.) Thus, since m(u) ∈ O(u0) and c ∈ \f(Un)\O(u0),
by Lemma 3 there is x˜ ∈ Λ(m(u), c) ∩ O(u0) such that (Λ(x˜, c)\{x˜}) ∩ O(u0) = ∅.
Note that x˜ 6= m(u0) since otherwise m(u0),m(u), c would not be m.a.i.(because
x˜ = m(u0) ∈ Λ(m(u), c)). Hence x˜ ∈ Λ(m(u0), c) by Lemma 5. Moreover, since
x˜ ∈ Λ(m(u), c) and x˜ ∈ Λ(m(u0), c), L1.2 implies x˜ /∈ Λ(m(u0),m(u)). Thus x˜ ∈
O(u0)\Λ(m(u0),m(u)), and therefore x˜ ∈ O(u) by Lemma 8, which contradicts (1.a)
since x˜ ∈ Λ(m(u0), c).
Case 2: Assume that x¯ 6= m(u). By Lemma 5 we have x¯ ∈ Λ(m(u), z). Let uˆ ∈ U˙∗
be such that m(uˆ) = x¯. We prove below that
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(2.a) (Λ(m(uˆ), z)\{m(uˆ)}) ∩O(uˆ) = ∅.
If y /∈ Λ(m(u),m(uˆ)), we have y ∈ O(uˆ) (this is implied by y ∈ O(u) and Lemma 8).
But then we are in the situation described in Case I (with uˆ playing the role of u)
which has been shown cannot occur.
If y ∈ Λ(m(u),m(uˆ)), since \f(Un) satisfies Condition D there is d ∈ \f(Un) such
that m(u),m(uˆ), d are m.a.i. We prove below that
(2.b) (Λ(m(uˆ),m(u))\{m(uˆ)}) ∩O(uˆ) = ∅, and
(2.c) there is x ∈ Λ(m(uˆ), d) ∩O(uˆ) such that m(uˆ),m(u), x are m.a.i..
Since x ∈ O(uˆ), m(u) /∈ O(uˆ) (by (2.b)) and m(uˆ),m(u), x are m.a.i., then by Lemma
6 there is x˜ ∈ Λ(m(uˆ),m(u))\{m(uˆ)}) ∩O(uˆ), which contradicts (2.b).
We now prove claims (1.a)− (1.c) and (2.a)− (2.c)
Proof of (1.a): Assume by way of contradiction that there is x ∈ Λ(m(u0), c) ∩
O(u). We show that m(u),m(u0), x are m.a.i.. We have (i) m(u) /∈ Λ(x,m(u0))
for if m(u) ∈ Λ(x,m(u0)), then Λ(m(u),m(u0)) ⊂ Λ(x,m(u0)) ⊂ Λ(m(u0), c) which
contradicts thatm(u),m(u0), c are m.a.i.; also (ii) x /∈ Λ(m(u),m(u0)), since x ∈ O(u)
and (Λ(m(u),m(u0))\{m(u)}) ∩ O(u) = ∅; finally, (iii) m(u0) /∈ Λ(m(u), x) for if
m(u0) ∈ Λ(m(u), x), then since x ∈ Λ(m(u0), c) L1.1 implies m(u0) ∈ Λ(m(u), c),
which contradicts that m(u),m(u0), c are m.a.i. Now, since m(u),m(u0), x are m.a.i.
as x ∈ O(u), and m(u0) /∈ O(u), there is xˆ ∈ (Λ(m(u),m(u0))\{m(u)}) ∩ O(u) by
Lemma 6, which is a contradiction.
Proof of (1.b): Since c /∈ Λ(m(u),m(u0)) (because m(u),m(u0), c are m.a.i.), and
c /∈ O(u) (by (1.a)), Lemma 8 implies c /∈ O(u0).
Proof of (1.c): Since m(u) ∈ Λ(y,m(u0)), then y /∈ Λ(m(u),m(u0)), and since
y ∈ O(u), then y ∈ O(u0) (by Lemma 8). Thus, since m(u) ∈ Λ(y,m(u0)), y ∈ O(u0)
implies (by Lemma 7) that m(u) ∈ O(u0).
Proof of (2.a): Assume by way of contradiction that there is x ∈ (Λ(m(uˆ), z)\{m(uˆ)})∩
O(uˆ).By Lemma 2 there is x˜ ∈ O(uˆ) such that x˜ ≥ x. Thus, x˜ ∈ (Λ(m(uˆ), z)\{m(uˆ)})∩
O(uˆ), and since m(uˆ) ∈ Λ(m(u), z)\{m(u)},and x˜ ∈ (Λ(m(uˆ), z)), we have x˜ /∈
Λ(m(u),m(uˆ)) by L1.3. Also x˜ ∈ O(uˆ) and x˜ /∈ Λ(m(u),m(uˆ)) implies (by Lemma
8) that x˜ ∈ O(u), which contradicts that (Λ(m(uˆ), z)\{m(uˆ)}) ∩O(u) = ∅.
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Proof of (2.b): Assume by way of contradiction that there is x ∈ (Λ(m(uˆ),m(u))\{m(uˆ)})∩
O(uˆ). Then z /∈ Λ(x,m(uˆ)) (otherwise z ∈ O(uˆ) by Lemma 7, which contradicts
(2.a)). Also since x ∈ O(uˆ) and (Λ(m(uˆ), z)\{m(uˆ)}) ∩ O(uˆ) = ∅ by (2.a), we
have x /∈ Λ(m(uˆ), z). If m(uˆ) /∈ Λ(x, z), then m(uˆ), x, z are m.a.i., and therefore
by Lemma 6 there is x0 ∈ (Λ(m(uˆ), z)\{m(uˆ)}) ∩ O(uˆ), which contradicts (2.a). If
m(uˆ) ∈ Λ(x, z), since x ∈ O(uˆ)\{m(uˆ)}, z ∈ \f(Un)\O(uˆ), m(uˆ) ∈ Λ(x, z) and
(Λ(m(uˆ), z)\{m(uˆ)}) ∩O(uˆ) = ∅, we are in the situation described in Case I (with uˆ
and x playing the role of u and y, respectively), which cannot occur.
Proof of (2.c): Since (Λ(m(uˆ),m(u))\{m(uˆ)}) ∩ O(uˆ) = ∅ by (2.b), then m(u) /∈
O(uˆ), and since m(uˆ),m(u), d are m.a.i., then d /∈ O(uˆ) by Lemma 6. Also since d /∈
Λ(m(uˆ),m(u)), then d /∈ O(u) by Lemma 8. Thus, m(uˆ) ∈ O(u) and d /∈ O(u), and
therefore by Lemma 3 there is x ∈ Λ(m(uˆ), d)∩O(u) such that (Λ(x, d)\{x})∩O(u) =
∅. Moreover, x 6= m(u) (because x ∈ Λ(m(uˆ), d) and m(uˆ),m(u), d are m.a.i.), and
x 6= m(uˆ) (because x ∈ Λ(m(u), d) by Lemma 5, and m(uˆ),m(u), d are m.a.i.). And
since x ∈ Λ(m(uˆ), d) and x ∈ Λ(m(u), d), L1.2 implies x /∈ Λ(m(u),m(uˆ)), and
therefore since x ∈ O(u), we have x ∈ O(uˆ) by Lemma 8. Hence x ∈ Λ(m(uˆ), d) ∩
O(uˆ).
We show thatm(uˆ),m(u), x are m.a.i.. As seen above, we have x /∈ Λ(m(u),m(uˆ)).
Suppose that m(uˆ) ∈ Λ(m(u), x); since x ∈ Λ(m(uˆ), d), we have m(uˆ) ∈ Λ(m(u), d)
by L1.1, which contradicts that m(uˆ),m(u), d are m.a.i.. Hence m(uˆ) /∈ Λ(m(u), x).
Finally, suppose that m(u) ∈ Λ(m(uˆ), x); since x ∈ Λ(m(uˆ), d), then Λ(m(uˆ), x) ⊂
Λ(m(uˆ), d), and thereforem(u) ∈ Λ(m(uˆ), d), which again contradicts thatm(uˆ),m(u), d
are m.a.i. Hence m(u) /∈ Λ(m(uˆ), x). 2
Lemma 10. Assume that \f (Un) satisfies Condition D. If there is u ∈ U˙∗ such that
O(u) = {m(u)}, then for each u ∈ U˙∗, one has O(u) = {m(u)}.
Proof: Assume that\f(Un) satisfies Condition D. Assume by way of contradiction
that there are u, u0 ∈ U˙∗ such that O(u) = m(u) and O(u0) 6= m(u0). Lemma 9 implies
O(u0) = \f(Un). Since \f(Un) satisfies Condition D there is x¯ ∈ \f(Un)\{m(u),m(u0)}
such that x¯ /∈ Λ(m(u),m(u0)). Since x¯ ∈ O(u0) and x¯ /∈ Λ(m(u),m(u0)), we have
x¯ ∈ O(u) by Lemma 8, which contradicts that O(u) = {m(u)}. 2
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With these results in hand we prove now Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1: Let f be a strategy-proof mechanism satisfying the assump-
tions of Theorem 1. First, it is shown by induction on the number of individuals that
f is dictatorial on (U˙∗)n. When n = 1, this is an implication of P1. Assume that
this claim is true for every mechanism for which n ≤ k−1. It is shown that the claim
holds for n = k.
We show that f is dictatorial on (U˙∗)k. By Lemma 10, either O(u) = {m(u)} for
each u ∈ U˙∗, or O(u) = \f (Uk) for each u ∈ U˙∗. Assume that O(u) = {m(u)} for
each u ∈ U˙∗, then f(u) = m(uk) for each u ∈ (U˙∗)k, and therefore Individual k is
a dictator for f on (U˙∗)k. Assume O(u) = \f (Uk) for each u ∈ U˙∗, and consider the
mechanism fu : Uk−1 → X given for each u−k ∈ Uk−1 by fu(u−k) = f(u−k, u). Each
fu satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1 — obviously each fu is strategy-proof, and
it is easy to see that \fu (Uk−1) = \f (Uk); see the proof of Theorem 1 in Moreno[5].
Thus the induction hypothesis implies that each fu is dictatorial on (U˙∗)k−1. We
show that a single individual i (always the same) is the dictator for each fu on
(U˙∗)k−1; i.e., that for each u ∈ (U˙∗)k, fu(u−k) = f(u) = m(ui), which establishes
that f is dictatorial on (U˙∗)n. Suppose not; w.l.o.g., assume that Individual 1 is
the dictator for fu on (U˙∗)k−1, and Individual 2 is the dictator for fu
0
on (U˙∗)k−1.
Let u−{1,2,k} ∈ (U˙∗)k−3 arbitrary, and let u1, u2 ∈ U˙∗ be such that m(u1) 6= m(u),
and m(u2) = m(u). Hence fu(u1, u2,u−{1,2,k}) = f(u1, u2,u−{1,2,k}, u) 6= m(u), and
fu
0
(u1, u2,u−{1,2,k}) = f(u1, u2,u−{1,2,k}, u0) = m(u), and therefore f is manipulable
by Individual k at (u1, u2,u−{1,2,k}, u), which is a contradiction.
Assume, without loss of generality, that Individual 1 is the dictator for f on (U˙∗)n.
We show that Individual 1 is a dictator for f on U˙∗ × U˙n−1, and then that he is also
a dictator for f of U˙n, which establishes Theorem 1.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is u ∈ U˙∗ × U˙n−1 such that f(u) 6=
m (u1) . Since \f (Un) satisfies Condition D and f(u),m (u1) ∈ \f (Un), there is z ∈
\f (Un) such that f(u), m (u1) and z are m.a.i.. Let u¯ ∈ U˙∗ be such that m(u¯) = z
and u¯(f(u)) > u¯(m (u1)). Then P1 (applied to fu1) implies
u¯(fu1(u¯, . . . , u¯)) = u¯(f(u1, u¯, . . . , u¯) ≥ u¯(f(u)) > u¯(m (u1)),
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and therefore f(u1, u¯, . . . , u¯) 6= m (u1) , which contradicts that Individual 1 is the
dictator for f on (U˙∗)n.
Finally, suppose, again by way of contradiction, that there are u ∈ U˙n and x˜ ∈
f (Un) such that u1(x˜) > u1(f(u)). Let u˜ ∈ U˙∗ be such that u1 (m (u˜)) > u1 (f(u)) .
Since Individual 1 is the dictator for f on U˙∗ × U˙n−1, one has
u1 (f(u˜,u−1)) = u1 (m (u˜)) > u1 (f(u)) ,
and therefore f is manipulable by Individual 1 at u, contradicting that f is strategy-
proof. 2
Lemma 11 below provides an auxiliary result that will be useful in the proofs of
propositions 1 to 3. The proof is this lemma given in Moreno[5] applies to the present
context without any change.
Lemma 11. If f is a mechanism satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 1, then there
is i ∈ N such that for each (ui,u−i) ∈ U∗ × Un−1, f(ui,u−i) ≤ m(ui).
Now Proposition 1 can be easily proved.
Proof of Proposition 1: Assume, without loss of generality, that Lemma 11
is satisfied for i = 1. It is shown that Individual 1 is a dictator for f. Suppose by
way of contradiction that there are u = (u1, . . . , un) ∈ Un and x ∈ f(Un) such that
u1(x) > u1(f(u)). Because f is non-wasteful, we have f (Un) ⊂ Xˆ, and therefore
f (Un) = \f (Un). Hence x ∈ \f (Un). Let u ∈ U∗ be such that m(u) = x. Lemma 11
yields f(u,u−1) ≤ x, and since f(u,u−1) ∈ \f (Un), we have f(u,u−1) = x. Then
u1(f(u,u−1)) = u1(x) > u1(f(u)),
and therefore f is manipulable by Individual 1 at u, contradicting that f is strategy-
proof. 2
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof of Proposition 2 is straightforward: Let f be
strategy-proof and efficient mechanism f : Un → X, where Xˆ satisfies condition D.
It is easy to see that efficiency implies that Xˆ ⊂ f(Un). (For x ∈ Xˆ, let u ∈ U∗ be
such that it is maximized on X at x; then efficiency implies f(u, . . . u) = x.) Thus,
\f(Un) = Xˆ. Hence f satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1, and therefore Lemma
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11 applies. An argument analogous to that of Proposition 1 establishes that f is
dictatorial. Moreover, since f(Un) ⊃ Xˆ, it is strongly dictatorial. 2
Proof of Proposition 3: Let f : U˙n → X be a strategy-proof mechanism such
that f(U˙n) satisfies Condition D. We proof Proposition 3 by showing that f can be
extended to a mechanism F : Un → X satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 1. The
mechanism F will therefore be dictatorial on U˙n by Theorem 1, which establishes
that f is (fully) dictatorial, since F coincides with f on U˙n.
The mechanism F is defined as follows: Let σ is an arbitrary selection on X, and
let F ≡ F n, where Fn is defined recursively as F 0 ≡ f, and F i : U i × U˙n−i → X is
given by
F i (u) =



F i−1 (u) if u ∈U i−1 × U˙n−i+1
σ (Mi (u)) otherwise,
whereMi (u) ≡Mni (u) is defined by lettingM0i (u) be the set of maximizers of ui on
F i−1
³
U˙ ,u−i
´
, andM ji (u) be the set of maximizers of uj onM
j−1
i (u) , for j = 1, ..., n.
(Here U i and Un−i are the power sets; e.g., U i = U × · · · × U, i times.) We show
by induction that F is well defined, it is strategy-proof, and satisfies \F (Un) = f(U˙n)
(and hence satisfies Condition D).
We show by induction that each F i, i ∈ {0, . . . n}, is well defined, it is strategy-
proof, and satisfies F i(U i × U˙n−i) = f(U˙n) = \f(U˙n) = \F i(U i × U˙n−i). First we note
that f satisfies P3 — the proof given in Moreno[5] (Lemma 4) applies to f without
any change. Hence f(U˙n) ⊂ \f(U˙n), and therefore f(U˙n) = \f(U˙n). Hence, since
F 0 = f, F 0 is well defined, it is strategy-proof, and satisfies F 0(Un) = f(U˙n) =
\f(U˙n) = \F 0(Un). Assume that the claim holds for F 0, . . . , F i−1. We show that F i
is well defined, it is strategy-proof, and satisfies F i(U i × U˙n−i) = f(U˙n) = \f(U˙n) =
\F i(U i × U˙n−i).
Let u ∈
³
U i × U˙n−i
´
8(U i−1×U˙n−i+1).We prove by induction that the setsM0i (u) ,
. . . ,Mni (u) =Mi (u) are non-empty subsets of F
i−1
³
U˙ ,u−i
´
, and therefore that F i
is well defined on
³
U i × U˙n−i
´
\(U i−1 × U˙n−i+1). Since F i coincides with F i−1 on
U i−1× U˙n−i+1, this establishes that F i is well defined on its entire domain. Moreover,
since F i (u) = σ(Mi (u)) ∈ Mi (u) = Mni (u) ⊂ F i−1
³
U˙ ,u−i
´
⊂ f(U˙n) (the last
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inclusion is implied by the induction hypothesis) for each u ∈
³
U i × U˙n−i
´
8(U i−1 ×
U˙n−i+1), we have F i(U i× U˙n−i) ⊂ f(U˙n). And since f(U˙n) = F i−1(U i−1× U˙n−i+1) =
F i(U i−1×U˙n−i+1) ⊂ F i(U i×U˙n−i) (because F i coincides with F i−1 on U i−1×U˙n−i+1),
we have F i(U i × U˙n−i) = f(U˙n) = \f(U˙n) = \F i(U i × U˙n−i).
Recall thatM0i (u) is the set of maximizers of ui on F
i−1
³
U˙ ,u−i
´
.HenceM0i (u) ⊂
F i−1
³
U˙ ,u−i
´
.We show that M0i (u) is non-empty. Note that F
i−1 is strategy-proof
by the induction hypothesis. It is easy to see that F i−1 satisfies P4 and P6 (the
proofs in Moreno[5], lemmas 5 and 7, respectively, apply to F i−1 without any change).
Therefore for each x ∈ F i−1
³
U˙ ,u−i
´
there is x0 ∈ \F i−1
³
U˙ ,u−i
´
such that x0 ≥ x.
Moreover, because F i−1(U i−1 × U˙n−i+1) = f(U˙n) = \f(U˙n) = \F i−1(U i−1 × U˙n−i+1)
by the induction hypothesis, we have
\
F i−1
³
U˙ ,u−i
´
= F i−1
³
U˙ ,u−i
´
. Thus, ui
has a maximizer on F i−1
³
U˙ ,u−i
´
, and therefore M0i (u) is non-empty subset of
F i−1
³
U˙ ,u−i
´
.Assume thatM0i (u) , . . . ,M
k−1
i (u) are non-empty subsets of F
i−1
³
U˙ ,u−i
´
,
where k ≤ n. We show that Mki (u) is a non-empty subset of F i−1
³
U˙ ,u−i
´
. Recall
thatMki (u) is the set of maximizers of uk onM
k−1
i (u) . Let x¯ ∈Mk−1i (u); then there
is x¯0 ∈ F i−1
³
U˙ ,u−i
´
=
\
F i−1
³
U˙ ,u−i
´
such that x¯0 ≥ x¯. Moreover, for each l < k, we
have ul(x¯0) ≥ ul(x¯) ≥ ul(x) for each x ∈M l−1i (u) , and therefore x¯0 ∈Mk−1i (u) . Thus
uk has a maximizer onMk−1i (u) .HenceM
k
i (u) is non-empty subset of F
i−1
³
U˙ ,u−i
´
.
Finally, we prove that F i is strategy-proof. It is easy to see that F i is not
manipulable by Individual i. Simply note that for each u ∈ U i × U˙n−i, F i (u)
maximizes ui on F i−1
³
U˙ ,u−i
´
⊇ F i (U,u−i), and hence ui (F i (u)) ≥ ui(x), for
x ∈ F i (U,u−i) ; i.e., ui (F i (u)) ≥ ui (F i (u0i,u−i)) for u0i ∈ U. We show F i is nei-
ther manipulable by any individual j ∈ N\ {i} . Assume, by way of contradiction,
that there are j ∈ N\ {i} , u ∈ U i × U˙n−i and u0j ∈ U such that uj (F i (u)) <
uj
¡
F i
¡
u0j ,u−j
¢¢
. Write F i
¡
u0j ,u−j
¢
= x, F i (u) = y, Θ(uj) = F i−1
³
U˙ ,u−{i,j}, uj
´
,
and Θ(u0j) = F i−1
³
U˙ ,u−{i,j}, u0j
´
. (Note that the sets Θ(·) are analog to the op-
tion sets defined in the proof of Theorem 1.) By the definition of F i, we have
x /∈ M ji (u) . Suppose that x ∈ Θ(uj); then there is j¯ ∈ {1, ..., j − 1} ∪ {i} such that
uj¯ (y) > uj¯ (x) , and uj0 (y) = uj0 (x) for j0 ∈ {1, ..., j¯ − 1} ∪ {i}. As F i
¡
u−j , u
0
j
¢
= x,
then y /∈M j¯i
¡
u−j, u
0
j
¢
, and as uj0 (y) = uj0 (x) for j0 ∈ {1, ..., j¯ − 1} ∪ {i}, one must
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have y /∈ Θ(u0j). Therefore there are two possible cases: either
(P3.1) x ∈ Θ(u0j) and y /∈ Θ(u0j), or
(P3.2) y ∈ Θ(uj) and x /∈ Θ(uj).
We show that (P3.1) leads to contradiction. Assume that (P3.1) holds. An argu-
ment analogous to that given in Lemma 3 establishes that there is xˆ ∈ Λ(x, y)∩Θ(u0j)
such that (Λ(xˆ, y)\{xˆ}) ∩Θ(u0j) = ∅. Note that because uj is strictly increasing and
concave, uj(x) > uj(y) and xˆ ∈ Λ(y, x), we have uj(xˆ) > uj(y). Let {uq} ⊂ U˙ be a
sequence of utility functions such that their upper contour sets at xˆ approach Λ(xˆ, y),
and their upper contour sets at y approach y + Rl+ (see Figure 2). The sequence
{F i−1 ¡uq,u−{i,j}, u0j¢} has a convergent subsequence, {F i−1 ¡uqs ,u−{i,j}, u0j¢}, whose
limit is xˆ. Similarly, the sequence {F i−1 ¡uqs,u−{i,j}, uj¢} has a convergent subse-
quence, {F i−1 ¡uqsk ,u−{i,j}, uj¢}, whose limit is y. Since F i−1 is strategy-proof, for
each qsk we have
uj(F
i−1 ¡uqsk ,u−{i,j}, uj¢) ≥ uj(F i−1 ¡uqsk ,u−{i,j}, u0j¢),
and therefore in the limit we have uj(y) ≥ uj(xˆ), which is a contradiction.
Finally, assume that (P3.2) holds. Then there is xˆ ∈ Λ(y, x) ∩ Θ(uj) such
that (Λ(xˆ, x)\{xˆ}) ∩ Θ(uj) = ∅. Since uj(xˆ) > uj(y), by the definition of F i,
F i(u−j , uj) = y implies the existence of j¯ ≤ j such that uj¯(y) > uj¯(xˆ) > uj¯(x).
And since F i(u−j, u0j) = x and uk(y) = uk(x) for k < j¯ − 1, then we must have
y /∈ Θ(u0j). Hence (P3.1) holds, which leads to a contradiction. 2
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